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1. Human Rights and Fundamentalism: Introductionary Remarks 
This paper intends to discuss some judicial decisions which today, in Italy 
as well as in Europe, constitute a major advance in the reasoning of complex 
issues, such as that of the relationship between secular constitutionalism 
and fundamentalism, the protection of individual rights and that of group 
(community) rights and multiculturalism. 
The focus of the research could be expressed as follow: which are the 
judicial decisions, not only in Italy, that challenge the issue on to the 
relationship between religious fundamentalism and the protection of 
individual human rights?  
The premise of the reasoning is based on another key-question: is it 
possible to view religious fundamentalism from within a balanced 
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framework, and is fundamentalism compatible with this method of judicial 
decision-making in a constitutional State1? 
Actually, individual human rights and fundamantalism are completely 
irreconcilable.  
Natural human rights adhere to a universal conception of rights, mostly 
founded on the formal principle of equality. 
In particular, with the Constitutions that came into force following the 
Second World War, this conception was impaired with the emergence and 
the recognition of differences and with the affirmation of a vision of a more 
substantial equality.  
The affirmation of the principle of substantive equality has remained 
persistently in tension with the notion of formal equality. Proof of this 
tension is the concept of affirmative action, an instrument of formal 
discrimination that violates formal equality and which, according to the U.S. 
Supreme Court case-Law, has to be temporally limited2. 
In the last few decades, the emergence of differences in the world of 
universal rights has caused a profound discussion over the limits of the 
conventional concept of human rights, which were founded on a limited 
prototype: that of the secular (or catholic) white man.  
In addition, it is evident that at the time when the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was proclaimed, women were excluded from the public 
 
1 For an affirmative response, see Zagrebelsky G., 1993 and Id., 2005. In the same 
perspective, see, as well, D’Amico M., 2008, p. 179, where the author demonstrates that 
conflits among constitutional rights can be solved only through the finding of a fair balance 
between the competing interests and not by their juxtaposition; talking about this method 
(metodo laico), the author states that «[v]i è […] una bussola che orienta nella selva delle 
posizioni contrapposte, apparentemente inconciliabili […]: sono i principi costituzionali che 
orientano tutti, che forniscono spesso la chiave per dipanare i conflitti». Aspetti 
fondamentali del metodo laico sono: a) il coinvolgimento di diversi attori istituzionali, 
ovvero Legislatore, Corte costituzionale, giudici comuni e cittadini, poiché non vi è un solo 
modo per difendere i diritti; b) il rifiuto di leggi che tentino di “moralizzare”, imponendo 
“valori”; c) l’acquisizione da parte dei singoli attori istituzionali, di volta in volta chiamati a 
intervenire, dei dati scientifici e la loro attenzione alla realtà, da prendere in considerazione 
in modo obiettivo; d) nonché, da ultimo, l’attenzione e la sensibilità verso il rispetto dei 
diritti delle minoranze, specialmente se “deboli”». 
2 See, D’Aloia A., 2002; Scarponi S., Stenico E., 2007, p. 449; Spitaleri F. (ed.), 2013; 
Dworkin R., 1998; Rosenfeld M., 1993; Leone S., 2009. 
MARIA ELISA D’AMICO 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 3 (2017), n. 10, pag. 1-38.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 3 
sphere, as well as homosexuals and african-americans were neglected in the 
United States3.  
Can the emergence of fundamentalism find a place and provoke a 
discussion on the false neutrality of human rights as universal human rights? 
Or, simply, is there no place for fundamentalism in the human rights’ 
discourse? 
From my point of view, the response to those questions is complicated 
by two elements that has to be fully considered.  
The first one is that for a long time we have tried to analyse the 
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism from the multicultural 
perspective4, in which we attempt to guarantee the identity of the group, 
according to the logic implied by the guarantee of individual rights, even 
when the values of the group are irreconcilable with the principles of 
universally human rights.  
The second consideration is that, especially in Italy, the principle of 
secularism is evolving in its relationship with the Catholic Church in such a 
way that it has been modified considerably and to such extent that it is now 
not applicable to other contexts. 
 
2. Secularism?  
The first consideration concerns the distinction between the positive and 
negative conception of secularism.  
Positive secularism refers to the preservation of religious values and 
symbols in the public sphere within a context of separation between the 
Church and the State, whereas negative secularism refers to the practice of 
excluding religion from the public sphere.  
In Europe, the allocation of religious freedom to the private sphere was 
the result of historical and cultural conditions and was based on the 
profound relationship between the Catholic religion and the public values of 
Western States.  
As Mario Ricca states “[t]he religion or religious conscientiouness 
(conscience), and freedom of religion could be confined to the private 
 
3 Facchi A., 2000; Cesareo V., 2000; Vitale E., 2000. 
4 On the impact of multiculturalism on the italian legal system with specific regard to 
women’s empowerment and political represenation, see D’Amico M., 2008, p. 117. 
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sphere thanks to the existence of this cultural grounding, consenting to 
identify that area as the dominion of the difference [between public and 
private values], but just a relative difference»5. 
In other words, it was possible to maintain a separation between the 
Church and the State since the values of each of the two coincided. This 
provided a basis for multiple categories of liberal thought and of judicial 
experience.  
However, what happens nowadays when there is a change involving both 
the social and the political context? 
The presence in Europe and also in Italy of a growing contingent of ethnic 
migrants has created a culturally heterogeneous context, where it is 
emerging a more profound connection between culture and religion, often 
in a conflicting atmosphere6.  
There is, in fact, an enormous and irreconcilable distance between the 
directives imposed by religions, such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddism, etc., and 
Christian religion which pervades our common understanding of secular 
rights and which is implicit in our public and, especially, civil Law.  
Thus, the reason behind the decision of not making any references to 
Christian roots in the European Union’s constitutional project, was that the 
traditional Christian values were already espressed in the principles of 
equality, liberty and tolerance7.  
In Europe, judicial decisions have never considered wheather the choice 
between negative forms of secularism (as in France) and positive forms (as 
in Italy) could have an impact on our freedom.  
Only few have questioned and interpreted the potential danger of 
allowing religious values to dominate the public sphere as a serious threat 
to our individual human rights8.  
However, the juxtaposition between positive and negative forms of 
secularism have been mostly conceived as a contrast between two models 
 
5 See Ricca M., 2006, p. 431. 
6 Ibidem, p. 431. See, also, Colaianni N., 2012; Randazzo B., 2008; Rimoli F., 1996, p. 8; 
on the positive form of secularism, see, more recently, Brunelli G., 2013. For a 
comprehensive analysis, see, also, Mancini S., Rosenfeld M. (eds.), 2014. 
7 See Cartabia M., 2009, p. 537. 
8 See D’Amico M., 2008a, p. 151.  
MARIA ELISA D’AMICO 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 3 (2017), n. 10, pag. 1-38.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 5 
of equality: one that focuses on a formal and universal dimension; the other 
one focused on differences that lead to discrimination.  
It was not foreseen that the positive form of secularism could also favour 
a progressive denial of universal human rights.  
Therefore, I’m willing to demonstrate that the reason behind is that 
positive form of secularism developped in such a way due to the existing 
peculiar relationship with Catholicism; and this was the case of Italy9.  
 
3. Jurisprudence, Culture and the Erosion of Individual Rights with 
regard to Fundamentalism 
In western societies, we have known for some decades that one of the 
most controversial problem was that of how to assimilate immigrants and 
their cultures without denying them rights.  
This multicultural approach, wanting to accomodate other cultures, 
attempts to establish a state of peaceful cohabitation.  
In particular, the judicial point of view has been elaborated upon the well-
known “cultural defense” doctrine10.  
According to the “cultural defense” doctrine, it is possible to justify or to 
punish less severely an act committeed «by a member of a minority culture, 
which is considered an offence by the legal system of the dominant culture. 
That same act is nevertherless, within the cultural group of the offender, 
condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved or even endorsed 
and promoted in the given situation»11. 
In several decisions, culture12 was considered relevant.  
One case involved a mother who forced her four-years-old child to beg 
for money in public13. The Supreme Court of Italy (Corte di Cassazione) held 
that the mother was not guilty, because the act she was accused of was a 
 
9 As an example of a negative form of secularism, see France and Thrkey. On Turkey, see 
Kavakchi M., 2010. 
10  See Dundes Renteln A., 2005; Friedman Ramirez L. (ed.), 2010. In Italy, on the 
connection between culture and criminal Law, see De Maglie C., 2010; Bernardi A., 2010; 
Basile F., 2012. 
11 See Van Broeck J., 2001, p. 1. See, also, Coleman D.L., 1996, p. 1093. 
12 To better understand the meaning and the use of culture in criminal cases, see J. 
Waldron, 2001, and, Id., 2002, p. 3. 
13 Italy, Corte di Cassazione, No. 44516, 17.09.2008, in “Guida al diritto”, 2009, p. 67. 
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well established pratice in her own culture.  
In another case, the argument of the “cultural defense” was used to 
mitigate the punishment: the Puscheddu case14, concerning the violence 
and sexual assault committed by an italian citizen from Sardinia, emigrated 
to Germany. The violence was perpetrated over a three weeks period 
against the defendant’s girlfriend, whom he had suspected of infidelity. The 
Court condemned the defendant only to two years of prison, which was a 
lighter sentence than that he could have received. And this was due to the 
Court’s decision to attach peculiar relevance to the cultural belonging of the 
defendant.  
In its judgement, the Court stated that it was required to take into 
consideration the cultural background of the defendant, because he came 
from Sardinia, a place where the relationship between men and women are 
structured in a peculiar way.  
The relevance accorded to the cultural belonging of the defendant 
therefore reflected the Court’s decision to treat him with greater lenience.  
Although it did not entirely excuse the defendant’s behaviour, the Court 
did consider the defendant’s ethnicity as a factor in attenuating the 
punishment. 
In another case, the Italian Criminal Supreme Court considered a case 
involving a homicide of an italian man committed by his employee after an 
argument between the two15.  
The Court decided to reduce the severity of the punishment in the light 
of the defendant’s cultural background; for the Court, the defendandt’s 
egyptian ethnicity contributed to his disproportionate response following 
the altercation. As a result, the Court decided not to prosecute the 
defendant to the full extent under the Law and therefore the defendant 
received a lighter sentence. 
In contrast, there have been examples of cases where the “cultural 
defense” doctrine did not influence the decision-making.  
 
14 German, Landgericht of Bückebu, 25.01.2006. 
15  Italy, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I, No. 6796 of 2011, 
http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1334943424Sentenza%20RCM%20futili%20
motivi%20DPC.pdf  
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In Italy, one famous case was the Hina case16. Hina was a twenty years 
old girl, killed by her father of Pakistani origin. The young girl had left home 
to cohabitate with her italian boyfriend and had previously refused to marry 
a Pakistani man, chosen by her family.  
All three levels of italian judicial system of criminal Law condemned the 
father for the homicide of his daughter and refused to make use of the 
“cultural defense” doctrine.  
Another case, even more significant, was that of the Supreme Court’s 
judgement, affirming that the “cultural defense” doctrine could not be 
applied in order to justify legal interpretations that contradict the Italian 
Constitution. 
The judgement originated from a case of domestic violence perpetrated 
by a moroccan man against his wife17. The Supreme Court refused to accept 
the defense’s argument that the defendant’s ethnicity warranted a lighter 
sentence. Therefore, the Court examined the arguments in sympathy with 
the concept of multiculturalism. 
Even so, the Court did not make use of the “cultural defense” doctrine, in 
that it recognized the danger it poses on the safeguard of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Italian Constitution. More specifically, according to the 
Court, the provisions set forth under Articles 2 (Individual Human Rights) and 
3 (Equality) establish a limit to any judicial decisions that could potentially 
infringe these supreme constitutional principles. 
With this respect, I find myself in complete agreement with this way of 
interpretation of the Law in the present case, since the principle of tolerance 
cannot be applied in such a way to deny the rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution.  
 
  
 
16 Italy, Corte di Cassazione, Sezione I penale, No. 6587, 2010. See, Poli P.F., 2012.  
17 Italy, Kassam case, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. VI, No. 46300, 26.11.2008. See, also, Corte 
di Cassazione penale, Sez. VI, No. 19674 of 2014. 
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3.1. Female Genital Mutilation and its Cultural Justification 
One interesting application of the “cultural defense” doctrine in the 
italian case-Law concerns the issue of female genital mutilation18; a term 
that covers a wide range of practices designed to limit women’s sexuality.  
Prior to italian Law, No. 7 of 2006, the Courts were used to prosecute 
cases of female genital mutilation as acts of violence under the general 
provisions of the italian system of criminal Law.  
However, it is important to underline that in few cases the Courts 
accepted the use of the “cultural defense” doctrine in handing down 
decisions involving significantly lighter sentences and, in handful of cases, 
even absolving the defendants altogether19.  
In the absence of a specific Law, italian judges recognized the applicability 
of the “cultural defense” doctrine and, often, they did not prosecute cases 
to their full extent especially in front of physical and/or sexual violence 
against women20.  
For this reason, in 2006, the italian Parliament enacted a Law targeting 
the issue of female genital mutilation (Law, No. 7 of 200621).  
The Law includes provisions defining detailed punishments for such 
practices, thus forcing the Courts to treat them with far greater severity.  
Since the passing of the Law, there was only one case 22  testing the 
application and interpretation of these new provisions, although female 
genital mutilation was and still is an increasing phenomenon in Italy.  
 
18 For a comparative analysis on Female Genital Mutilation responses in the European 
Union, see Leye E., Sabbe A., 2009. 
19 See D’Amico M., 2008a, p. 132; Basile F, 2007, p. 1336. 
20 As an example, see, Italy, Criminal Court, Milan, 1999; Tribunal for minors, Turin, 
1997. 
21 Basile F., 2006, p. 682; Facchi A., 2008, p. 90; Magnini V., 2009, p. 1081; Miazzi L., 
Vanzan A., 2006, p. 13; Cesqui E., 2005, p. 749; Paganelli M., Ventura F., 2004, p. 453; Nobile 
M., 2015. 
22 Italy, Court of Verona, 2010, and Corte d’Appello of Venice, No. 148 of 2012. For a 
comment on the judgement, see, Pecorella C., 2011, p. 853; for a complete descrition of the 
affair, see, Basile F., 2013, who shows perplexity over the use of a criminal punishment. 
Contrary to this way of reasoning, see Ruggeri A., 2015, p. 204, who underlines the 
importance of reaching a balance between the best interest of the child and our 
constitutional culture, through solutions that have to be equal for all. The data is based on 
a research on published judgements using De Jure4 database. 
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Furthermore, in spite of this new Law, the case was decided in the light 
of the “cultural defense” doctrine.  
As a result, it appears that institutionalized discrimination against women 
continues to exist and that society is still willing to tolerate the devaluation 
of women’s rights.  
Even worse, judges seem willing to ignore the Law thereby contributing, 
throught their decisions, to the perpetuation of a practice that clearly 
infringes women’s rights.  
 
4. Italian Decisions on the Relationship between the State and Catholic 
Religion 
4.1. The Italian Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence on Secularism 
In Italy, for a long time, the issue of freedom of religion was focused on 
the relationship between the Italian State and the Catholic Church. 
Therefore, the principle of secularism needs to be firstly understood in the 
light of such a peculiar relationship.  
For this purpose, I believe it is of a great importance to start with a brief 
analysis of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the principle of 
secularism along with a specific focus on the category of “positive 
secularism” and its new interpretation. 
In the italian constitutional system, it was the Constitutional Court (see, 
judgement No. 203 of 198923 on the teaching of religion in public schools) 
the first to held the principle of secularism as a supreme constitutional 
principle that comes from Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 19 and 20 of the Constitution.  
In that case, the Constitutional Court interpreted the principle of 
secularism as an expression of positive secularism; nevertheless, it is not 
without a reason that the principle of secularism was understood according 
to its positive connotation only with respect to Catholicism.  
Moving forward from a formal equality among religions, the 
Constitutional Court has thus stated that the principle of secularism does 
not require neither impose the State to be neutral when it comes to its 
relationship with religion, but, rather, it asks the State to guarantee freedom 
 
23 Constitutional Court, No. 203 of 1989, in “Giur. cost.”, 1989, 890. For a critique of the 
judgement, see Saccomanno A., 1989, p. 903; Musselli L., 1989, p. 908; Floridia G., Sicardi 
S., 1989, p. 1086; Colaianni N., 1989, p. 1333. 
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of religion in a context of a both religious and cultural pluralism (see, 
judgement No. 203 of 1989: «esso implica non indifferenza dello Stato 
dinanzi alle religioni ma garanzia dello Stato per la salvaguardia della libertà 
di religione, in regime di pluralismo confessionale e culturale»).  
The very same statement is recurrent and even better clarified in 
subsequent judgements24 , among which judgement No. 329 of 1997 on the 
conformity with the Constitution of those criminal provisions that used to 
punish harshly the contempt of Catholic religion, as the State religion, rather 
than that of other confessions. In judgement, No. 329 of 1997 25 , the 
Constitutional Court held the non-compliance with the Constitution of the 
more favourable treatment reserved to the Catholic religion and states that 
the principle of secularism imposes the legislator to be equidistant and 
impartial with respect to all confessions (see, judgement, No. 329 of 1997: 
«comporta equidistanza e imparzialità della legislazione rispetto a tutte le 
confessioni religiose»)26.  
Thus, according with the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the 
principle of secularism, it must be interferred that in Italy the State should 
promote acts and legislative interventions aimed at protecting the religious 
phenomenon as a whole and should guarantee equality of treatment among 
all religions. 
Although the principle of secularism is enshrined in italian Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court was late in acting accordingly, especially as to those 
provisions of the italian criminal Law system which favoured the Catholic 
religion.  
In its previous judgements, the Constitutional Court “saves” the 
regulation provided under the Rocco Code of 1930.  
As for its justification and conformity with the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court in its first case-law recalls the so-called “quantitative” 
 
24 Constitutional Court, No. 259 of 1990, in “Giur. cost.”, 1990, p. 1542; Constitutional 
Court, No. 195 of 1993, in Giur. cost., 1993, p. 1324, with a comment by Acciai R., 1993, p. 
2151; Di Cosimo G., 1993, p. 2165. 
25 Constitutional Court, No. 329 of 1997, in “Giur. cost.”, 1997, p. 3335 with a comment 
by Rimoli F., 1997, p. 3343. 
26 Ibidem, § 2 of the Cons. in Dir. 
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argument. Therefore, in judgement, No. 79 of 195827, on the compliance 
with the Constitution of the crime of blasphemy, the Constitutional Court 
clarifies that the referral to the State-religion, with respect to Catholicism, is 
to be understood in the light of the number of italian citizens – to the Court, 
close to the totality – who profess the Catholic religion (see, judgement, No. 
79 of 1958: «alla circostanza che questa è professata nello Stato italiano 
dalla quasi totalità dei suoi cittadini»). In the Constitutional Court’s view, this 
is the element that justifies the compatibility with the Constitution of the 
regulation that favoured Catholic religion.  
This case-Law has been progressively abandoned by the Constitutional 
Court along with the social and cultural challenges faced by italian society 
until judgement, No. 440 of 199528 on the annulment of the differential 
treatment provided under the criminal code as to the crime of blasphemy.  
Thus, the Constitutional Court declared the inconstitutionality of the 
crime of blasphemy, as previously formulated, and extended the criminal 
punishment to all confessions without distinctions. In that case, the 
Constitutional Court fully explaines the non-foundation of the so-called 
quantitative argument as a justification for the preferential treatment 
accorded to the Catholic religion. More specifically, in that judgement, the 
Constitutional Court stated that when it comes to religion, the Constitution 
imposes the equal protection of each and every person’s freedom of 
conscience irrespectively of his or her confession of belonging (see, 
judgement No. 440 of 1995: «in materia di religione, non valendo il numero, 
si impone ormai la pari protezione della coscienza di ciascuna persona che si 
riconosce in una fede, quale che sia la confessione religiosa di 
appartenenza»)29. As it is evident from its reasoning, the Court valued the 
individuality of the religious sentiment over the “quantitative” argument30.  
 
27 Constitutional Court No. 79 of 1958, in “Giur. cost.”, 1958, p. 990. For a critique, see 
Esposito C., 1958, p. 990. 
28 Constitutional Court No. 440 of 1995, in “Giur. cost.”, 1995, p. 3475. For a comment, 
see Ramacci F., 1995, p. 3484; D’Amico M., 1995, p. 3487. 
29 Ibidem, § 3.2. of the Cons. in Dir. 
30 A challenging of this jurisprudence was though inherent in a previous judgement, No. 
188 of 1975 (in “Giur. cost.”, 1975, p. 1508), where the Constitutional Court started 
recognizing the constitutional relevance of the individual. Therefore, in that judgement, the 
Court interpreted religion as a feeling that lives within the intimacy of the individual’s 
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4.2. The Crucifix in Public Schools: Differences between Italy and the Rest 
of Europe 
A key question, faced by italian and european Courts, concerns the 
display of the crucifix in public schools31.  
In Italy, the main issue was about the conformity with the constitutional 
principle of secularism of the duty to exhibit the crucifix in public schools 
classrooms.  
The judges challenged its compliance with the Constitution and asked the 
Constitutional Court32 to verify weather the provision was in accordance 
with the principle of secularism. However, in its judgement the 
Constitutional Court “decided to not decide”, helding that the question of 
constitutionality was non-admissible because of the non-legislative but 
regulatory nature of the provision of suspected inconstitutionality33.  
Nevertheless, the most relevant judgements were those released by the 
Administrative Court of Veneto Region (TAR Veneto)34 and by the Council of 
State35 on an application issued by a parent of a primary school child after 
the refusal, opposed by the school administration, to remove the crucifix 
from the wall of the class attended by the child.  
 
conscience and that it is also referrable to groups of individuals bound to each others by 
the profession of a common faith. Once rejected the “quantitative” argument (together 
with all the others that had previously justified differential treatments in favour of the 
State’s religion), and affirmed the centrality of religious feeling, the Constitutional Court 
has, from then on, challenged the constitutionality of all those provisions that were 
expression of a favor for the Catholicisism.  
31 See, Bin R., Brunelli G., Pugiotto A., Veronesi P. (eds.), 2008. 
32 Constitutional Court No. 389 of 2004, in “Giur. cost.”, 2004, p. 4280. See, Lariccia S., 
2004, p. 4287; Gemma G., 2004, p. 4292; Rimoli F., 2004, p. 4300; Oddi A., 2004, p. 4306; 
Gigli A., Gattamelata S., 2004, p. 4309. 
33 The obligation to dispay the crucifix in school classrooms is established under Article 
118 of the Regio Decreto, No. 965 of 1924 (that provides as follow: every institution of 
secondary school has «the national flag; every class, the image of the crucifix and the 
portrait of the King») and under Article 119 of Regio Decreto, No. 1297 of 1928 (that 
includes the crucifix within school classrooms’ furniture referring to an annex). 
34 TAR Veneto, No. 1110, 17.03.2005. For a comment, see Fiorita N., 2005; Cavana P., 
2006, p. 270; Iannotta R., 2005, p. 99. 
35Council of State, No. 556, 13.02.2006. For a critique, see Randazzo B., 2006, p. 78; 
Gilozzi E., 2006, p. 841.  
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The TAR Veneto rejected the application based on a controversial 
interpretation of the meaning of the crucifix.  
According to the Court, the crucifix represents an historical and cultural 
symbol that possesses an identitarian value for italian people; and it also 
embodies the historical and cultural path of the italian State.  
Although the Court did not deny the religious meaning of the crucifix, it 
did not consider it relevant for the purpose of its decision. In fact, the crucifix 
embodies a system of values, such as equality and religious tolerance, 
enshrined in the italian Constitution. In other words, in the Court’s view, the 
crucifix would also be a symbol of the secularity of the italian State. 
The Council of State, the Supreme Administrative Court, confirmed the 
Court’s judgement.  
According to the Council of State, the meaning of the crucifix varies 
depending on where it is located. Moreover, in spite of its religious meaning, 
the Council of State recognized that in public schools the crucifix serves a 
symbolic function that is highly instructive irrespective of the religion 
professed by the students.  
Therefore, it symbolizes the religious origin of values such as tolerance, 
mutual respect, personal development, achievement of individual rights as 
well as the refusal of discrimination; a set of values that, considered as a 
whole, connotes italian society. 
The matter of the dispaly of the crucifix in italian public schools was then 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights by the same applicant who 
had therefore previously exhausted domestic remedies36.  
As for the violations, the applicant complained that the display of 
crucifixes in the classrooms of italian public schools infringes the right to 
education, guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as well as the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion set forth under Article 9 of the Convention. 
In its first judgement, the Second Section37 of the European Court of 
 
36 European Court of Human Rights, Lautsi and others v. Italy, No. 30814/06. The first 
judgement was issued by the Second Section (3.11.2009); the Grand Chamber delivered its 
judgement on 18.03.2011.  
37 See Guazzarotti A., 2010, p. 185; Bartole S., 2010, p. 65; Conte R., 2010, p. 263; Fiorillo 
V., 2010, p. 145; Ruggiu I., 2010, p. 364; Lugato M., 2010, p. 402. 
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Human Rights found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, of the 
Convention, taken together with Article 9, in that the State «is forbidden to 
pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting 
parents’ religious and philosophical convinctions»38. That is to say that «the 
State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any kind of 
power of its part to assess the legitimacy of religious convinctions or the 
ways of expressing those convinctions. In the context of teaching, neutrality 
should guarantee pluralism»39. 
Moreover, in the Second Section’s view, the crucifix is without any doubt 
a religious sign. Even admitting its plurality of meaning, the Second Section 
considered the crucifix as mainly a symbol associated with Catholicism that 
«may therefore be considered ‘powerful external symbol’»40.  
Therefore, the Second Section drew the conclusion that the display of 
crucifixes in public schools «restricts the right of parents to educate their 
children in conformity with their convinctions and the right of schoolchildren 
to believe or not believe»41 and that the practice is also to be considered 
«incompatible with the State’s duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of 
public authority, particularly in the field of education»42.  
The italian Governement asked for the case to be referred to the Grand 
Chamber, that overturned the Second Section’s judgment43.  
Firstly, in the Grand Chamber’s view, «is it not for the Court to rule on the 
compatibility of the presence of crucifixes in State-school classrooms with 
the principle of secularism as enshrined in Italian Law»44. Therefore, the 
Grand Chamber does not recognize any relevance to the principle of 
secularism for the purpose of its judgment, confining its judgement to the 
 
38 European Court of Human Rights, Lautsi and others v. Italy, [Second Section], No. 
30814/06, § 47. 
39 Ibidem, § 47. 
40 Ibidem, § 54. 
41 Ibidem, § 57. 
42 Ibidem, § 57. 
43 See, Carlassare L., 2011, p. 291; Mancini S., 2011, p. 425; Fiorillo V., 2011, p. 422; 
Pacini M., 2011, p. 851; Rescigno P., 2011, p. 893; Sapienza R., 2011, p. 564. See, also, 
Itzcovich G., 2013, p. 287; Lambt R., 2010, p. 751. For further readings, see Temperman J. 
(ed.), 2012. 
44 European Court of Human Rights, Lautsi and others v. Italy, [GC], No. 30814/06, § 57. 
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compliance of the case with Article 9 and Article 2, Protocol, No. 1, of the 
Convention.  
Thus, the Grand Chamber clarifies the content of the obligation laid down 
on Contracting States in the field of education, stating that «the State, in 
exercising its functions with regard to education and teaching, to take care 
that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an 
objective critical and pluralistic manner, enabling pupils to develop a critical 
mind particularly with regard to religion in a calm atmosphere free of any 
proselytism»45.  
The Grand Chamber, even taking into consideration that the prohibition 
to indoctrinate applies not only to the setting and planning of the curriculum 
but also to the school environment, draws the conclusion that, although the 
crucifix «is above all a religious symbol [...], [t]here is no evidence before the 
Court that the display of a religious symbol on classrooms walls may have an 
influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or 
does not have an effect on young persons whose convinctions are still in the 
process of being formed»46.  
More specifically, the Grand Chamber acknowledges that the italian 
regulations, in prescribing the presence of the crucifix in public school 
classrooms, «confer on the country’s majority religion preponderant 
visibility in the school environment» 47 ; nevertheless, in the Grand 
Chamber’s view, «[t]his is not in itself sufficient [...] to denote a process of 
indoctrination on the respondent State’s part» 48 and it must be read in 
conjunction with the passive nature of the crucifix as a religious symbol49. 
Moreover, the Grand Chmaber found not without importance that italian 
schools open up to other religions as well as to Catholicism; in fact, as 
reported by the italian Government, there is no prohibition for pupils to 
wear other religions’ symbols within the school environment50. 
To sum up, the crucifix affair shows, on the one hand, italian Courts’ will 
 
45 Ibidem, § 62. 
46 European Court of Human Rights, Lautsi and others v. Italy, [GC], No. 30814/06, §66. 
47 Ibidem, § 70. 
48 Ibidem, § 71. 
49 Ibidem, § 72. 
50 Ibidem, § 74. 
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to interpret the crucifix as a sign of tradition and, even, of “constitutional” 
values – which would not challenge its presence within the public 
institutions of a secularist State –, on the other, the European Court of 
Human Right’s tendence to not infringe the Contracting States’ margin of 
appreciation; this approach, as we will show above, is similarly recurrent in 
the ECtHR’s judgements on the islamic veil affair, where the Court justifies 
the different choices made by the Contracting States on the interpretation 
of the principle of secularism and by recalling the socio-political context of 
the respondent State. 
 
5. The Islamic Veil and its Misunderstanding in the Italian and in the 
European Jurisprudence  
Italian jurisprudence on cultural defense includes judgements of the 
Administrative Courts on the anullment of majors’ measures prohibiting the 
wearing of the integral isalmic veil (niqab).  
The Administrative Courts state that such prohibition could not be 
introduced by a major’s decision51. Moreover, the Administrative Court of 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 52  and the Council of State (Supreme Administrative 
Court)53, as a second instance Court, recognized the legitimacy of the niqab 
as a sign of cultural expression.  
In the Supreme Administrative Court’s view, the niqab represents a 
traditional item of clothing for some populations, still used as a religious 
symbol and it entails a use that it does not presuppose the avoidance of 
personal identification, but, rather, it marks the tradition of populations and 
cultures.  
Although the Supreme Administrative Court did not focus on the niqab 
belonging to the category of cultural or religiuos symbols, that was enough 
 
51  More precisely, the Major of Azzano Decismo’s Council adopted a measure that 
interpreted the prohibition of masking in public places, provided under Article 85, comma 
1, of Regio Decreto, No. 773 of 1931, as derogable during Carnival, Halloween, and other 
prescribed festivities, and that the prohibition, set forth under Article 5 of Law No. 152 of 
1975 of using tools to obstacolate personal recognition has to be aslo referred to the Islamic 
veil that cover faces. The prefect withdrew the Major’s ordinance. For a complete review, 
see A. Lorenzetti, 2010, p. 349. 
52 Administrative Court of Friuli Venezia, judgement, No. 645 of 2006. 
53 Council of State, judgement, No. 3076 of 2008. 
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to reject the Azzano Decimo’s Council appeal, stating that the niqad is not 
by any means aimed at eluding personal identification. 
Again, in this case, the italian Court “justifies” a gender-based 
discriminatory culture; in fact, the tolerance of other’s cultures results in a 
contrast with the principle of equality between men and women, but the 
Court chose not to take this element into account.  
On another note, it could be of interest to recall the initiative undertaken 
by Lombardia Region in early 2016 to forbid the wearing of the Islamic veil 
within hospitals and public places, whose legitimacy within the Italian legal 
system has been recently confirmed by a judgement held by the 
Administrative Tribunal of Lombardia Region on April 20th 2017. 
Similarly to domestic Courts, the ECtHR decided on cases about the 
conformity to the European Convention of Human Rights of the ban to wear 
the islamic veil established in some of the Contracting States54.  
More specifically, the cases brought to the ECtHR involved Laws 
prohibiting the islamic veils in States that interpret the principle of 
secularism in negative terms, such as Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (2005)55, S.a.s. v. 
France (2014) 56  and Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey (2010) 57, where the ECtHR 
found a violation of the European Convention in that Turkey’s criminal Law 
system punished people who wore religious items of clothing and restricted 
people’s freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion.  
Althought centered on different facts, it is of a great importance to begin 
with the Merve Kavakçi affaire: a case about a turkish woman who tried to 
sit in the turkish Parliament weraing the islamic headscarf. 
Nevertheless, the very firts judgment on the islamic veil issued by the 
ECtHR was the Leyla Şahin v. Turkey case58.  
 
54  From an international law viewpoint, see Bennoune K., 2007, p. 367; for a 
comprehensive overview, see Ferrari A., Pastorelli S. (eds.), 2013. 
55  European Court of Human Rights, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, [GC], No. 44774/98, 
10.11.2005. See, Nieuwenhuis A., 2005, p. 495; Hoopes T., 2006, p. 719; Langlaude S., 2006, 
p. 929; Marshall J., 2006, p. 452; Saktanber A., Corbacioglu G., 2008, p. 514. 
56 European Court of Human Rights, S.a.s. v. France, [GC], n. 43835/11, 1.07.2014. See, 
Steinbach A., 2015, p. 4; Marshall J., 2015, ngv 003; T. Syring, 2014; Starita M., 2014, p. 101. 
57  European Court of Human Rights, Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, [GC], n. 
41135/98, 23.10.2010. 
58 It is aslo important to keep in mind that at that time the ban of wearing the veil was 
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The case originated from an application submitted by a young turkish 
woman, student of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Istanbul, 
against the circular issued by the Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul University that 
stated that «students whose ‘heads are covered’ (who wear the islamic 
headscarf) and students (including overseas students) with beards must not 
be admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials».  
The applicant complained the violation of Article 9 (Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion), Article 8 (Right to private and family life), Articole 
10 (Freedom of expression) and Article 14 (Prohibition to Discrimination) of 
the Convention.  
The ECtHR, taking into specific account the turkish historical background, 
found the measured issued by the University’s administration proportionate 
to the aim pursued, meaning the safeguard of the principle of secularism.  
In the Grand Chamber’s view, in a context «where the values of pluralism, 
respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the Law of 
men and women are being taught and applied in practice, it is 
understandable that the relevant authorities should wish to preserve the 
secular nature of the institution concerned and so consider it contrary to 
such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the 
Islamic headscarf, to be worn»59.  
Moreover, the Court found the ban to wear the Islamic hedscarf 
necessary in a democratic society. Thus, the Court states that the ban serves 
to avoid discriminatory treatments suffered by those who do not profess the 
religion of the majority and, to this end, recognizes a wide margin of 
appreciation to the respondent State60. 
Another case is that regarding a prohibition, established by a french 
Law 61 , to wear une tenue destinée à dissimuler son visage (an item of 
clothing that covers faces). 
According to the provision, the violation is assisted with a criminal 
 
not provided under a Law, but the decision over its prohibition was referred to each 
institution such as to public universities. On this case, see also Tega D., 2004, p. 846. 
59  European Court of Human Rights, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, [GC], No. 44774/98, 
10.11.2005, § 118. 
60 Ibidem, § 122. 
61 Law No. 2010-1192, 11.04.2011. 
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sanction, a fine of 150,00 euros or the obligation to attend a course on 
french citizenship. In addition to that, anyone who forces a person to cover 
his or her face because of the sex of belonging is punished with one year of 
detention together with a fine of 300,00 euros. 
Finally, if a minor is involved, the punishment goes up to two years of 
detention and to 600,00 euros fine. Therefore, the Law seems to be neutrally 
formuled and aimed at protecting public security since its scope is directed 
to preclude faces cover-up. 
Nevertheless, it is clear by the parliamentary works that the Law’s hidden 
scope was that of impeding the affirmation and the spread of the practice 
of wearing the Islamic headscarf in public places, accordingly to the negative 
nature of the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution which 
asks for the neutrality of public spaces and that perceived religion as a 
private matter only62. 
The ECtHR’s judgement, issued on July 1st, 201463, originated by the 
application submitted by a young islamic woman, born and resident in 
France, who complained the violation of Articles 3 (Prohibition of Torture), 
8 (Right to respect for private and family life), 9 (Freedom to thought, 
conscience and religion), 10 (Freedom of expression), 11 (Freedom of 
assembly and association) and 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
In her submission, the applicant states that no one, neither her husband 
or other members of her family, forced her to wear the integral islamic veil 
and that she wears the niqab in public and in private, but not systematically. 
Nevertheless, she wishes to be able to wear it when she chooses to do so, 
depending on her spiritual feelings (as during the Ramadan). Moreover, the 
applicant specifies that she does not claim to be able to keep the niqab on 
«when undergoing a security check, at the bank or in airports»64 and she 
 
62 Moreover, the Law seeks to protect islamic women, minors especially, by offering 
them a prohibition that allows them to avoid family’s or living communities’ pressions, often 
violent; with this respect, the french legislator demonsrates to have taken into account the 
conclusions drawn from the Stasi’s Report. For an overview on the scarf affair in France 
prior to the EctHR’s Judgement, see Brun-Rovet M., 2000. 
63 For a comment, see Valentino A., 2014; Ruggiu I., 2014. 
64 European Court of Human Rights, S.a.s. v. France, [GC], n. 43835/11, 1.07.2014, § 13. 
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agrees to show her face «when requested to do so for necessary identity 
checks»65 . 
Although the applicant did not claim to have been prosecuted or 
convicted for wearing the full-face veil in a public place, the Court considers 
her a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, in that the 
ban, though general and abstract, requires her either to modify her conduct 
or to risk a prosecution66. 
As regard to the alleged violations, the Court held that there were no 
violations, neither of Article 9 of the Convention, which safeguards freedom 
of religion.  
The Court is of the view that, although the ban was introduced for public 
security reasons, it nevertheless «raises questions in terms of the right to 
respect for private life [...] of women who wish to wear the full-face veil for 
reasons related to their beliefs, and in terms of their freedom to manifest 
those beliefs [...]»67. 
Therefore, the Court goes on by examining the application under both 
Articles 8 and 9 of the European Convention. 
That being said, the Court considers the ban an interference or a 
limitation in the applicant’s rights protected under Articles 8 and 9 of the 
Convention; therefore, the Court scrutinizes its compatibility with the 
second paragraphs of those Articles, verifiyng weather the ban is prescribed 
by the Law, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in those 
paragraphs and weather it is necessary in a democratic society to achieve 
the aim or aims concerned. With this respect, the Court emphasizes that, 
according to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Law, «[t]he 
systematic concealment of the face in public places, contrary to the ideal of 
fraternity, [...] falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is 
necessary for social interaction»68.  
For this reason, the Court considers it admissible «that a State may find it 
essential to give particular weight in this connection to the interaction 
between individuals and may consider this to be adversely affected by the 
 
65 Ibidem, § 13. 
66 Ibidem, § 57. 
67 Ibidem, § 106. 
68 Ibidem, § 141. 
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fact that some conceal their faces in public place»69. 
Thus, the Court, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation 
afforded to the respondent State, finds that «the ban can be regarded as 
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions 
of ‘living together’ as an element of the ‘protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’»70 and, therefore, maintains that there has been no 
violation either of Article 8 or of Article 9 of the European Convention. 
Nevertheless, the Court warrants particular attention on several 
arguments put forward by the applicant and by the intervening 
organisations. 
Firts of all, the Court holds that «there is no doubt that the ban has a 
significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the 
applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their 
beliefs»71, drawing attention to the discriminatory nature of the Law as 
perceived by the Muslims. 
Secondly, even admitting that it is not for the Court to rule on whether 
legislation is desirable in such matters, the Court underlines that «a State 
which enters into a legislative process of this kind takes the risk of 
contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain 
categories of the population and of encouraging the expression of 
intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to promote tolerance»72. 
Even so, the Court is of the view that «the question whether or not it 
should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places constitutes a 
choice of society»73, that justifies the wide margin of appreciation afforded 
to the respondent State in the present case. And, in fact, the Court stresses 
that «in such circumstances, the Court has a duty to exercise a degree of 
restraint in its review of Convention compliance, since such review will lead 
it to assess a balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process 
within the society in question. The Court has, moreover, already had 
occasion to observe that in matters of general policy, on which opinions 
 
69 Ibidem, § 141. 
70 Ibidem, § 157. 
71 Ibidem, § 146. 
72 Ibidem, § 149. 
73 Ibidem, § 153. 
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within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the 
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight»74. 
Another interesting case crossing the question of the ban of veiling is the 
affaire Kavakçi v. Turkey75.  
The application was submitted by two former members of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and members of Fazilet Partisi with respect to the 
Constitutional Court’s judgement of 22 June 2001 that dissolved Fazilet 
Partisi on the ground that the party, which had based its political programme 
on the question of wearing of the Islamic headscarf, had become a «centre 
of activities contrary to the principle of secularism»76.  
More specifically, the case originated in 1999 right after the Principal 
State Counsel’s accusation of Ms Kavakçi for having taken an oath before the 
National Assembly wearing an Islamic headscarf. Soon after, Ms Kavakçi was 
also stripped of her Turkish nationality on the ground that she had acquired 
US nationality without the prior agreement of the Turkish authorities.  
The ECtHR found a violation of Article 3, of Protocol No. 1, which protects 
the right to free elections, because it considered that the sanctions imposed 
on the applicants were serious and could not be regarded as proportionate 
to the legitimate aims pursued, meaning to preserve the secular nature of 
the Turkish political system. 
Therefore, the case did not directly involves the ban of veiling while 
seating in the Parliament, but the loss of citizeship and, even before, the 
dissolution of a political party because of its presumed incompatibilty with 
the constitutional principle of secularism. 
There is only one case, Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey77, where the 
Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention because of the wearing 
of turbans by a group of men, during an islamic religious ceremony. The 
 
74 Ibidem, § 154. 
75 European Court of Human Rights, Kavakçi v. Turkey, No. 71907, 28.05.2001. On the 
case, see D’Amico M., 2008a, p. 147. For further reading, see Kavakçi M., 2014. 
76 European Court of Human Rights, Kavakçi v. Turkey, § 21. 
77  European Court of Human Rights, Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, [GC], No. 
41135/98, 23.10.2010. Both Ruggiu I., 2014 and Valentino A., 2014 underline the 
distinctiveness of the case. Moreover, the Author shows that, althought the Court recalled 
the case in its judgement on the S.a.s. case, it therefore did not apply that very same ratio 
by referring to the distinguishing tecnique. 
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applicants, 127 men belonging to a religious group, in October 1996 met for 
a religious ceremony held at the mosque and toured the city streets wearing 
the distinctive dress of their group. 
Following various incidents on the same day, they were arrested and 
taken into police custody. They were then prosecuted for breaching the anti-
terrorism legislation and for habing refused to remove their turbants. 
The ECtHR noted that the legislation in question was not applicable to 
ordinary citizens like the applicants who, not being representatives of the 
State engaged in public service, could not be bound, on account of any 
official status, by a duty of discretion in the public expression of their 
religious beliefs78.  
That being said, the Court was of the view that from the evidence brought 
by the turkish Government there was nothing in the case file to suggest that 
the manner in which the applicants had manifested their beliefs by their 
specific attire represented or might have represented a threat for public 
order or a form of pressure on others.  
Therefore, the Court held that the applicants have only been punished 
for wearing turbans in a public space and that the Government failed in 
proving the necessity of the legislative measure and its proporzionality to 
the aim of preserving public security.  
For the above reasons, the Court found that there has been a violation of 
Article 9 of the Convention79. 
The debate on the islamic headscarf has more recently gained resonance 
even within the European Union with two cases brought before the 
European Union Court of Justice that involved french and belgian laws on 
the absolute ban to wear the islamic headscarf (reference is made to: Asma 
Bougnaoui Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. 
Micropole SA and Samira Achbita e Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en 
voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV), both dismissed by the 
 
78 Ibidem, § 48. 
79 More recently, the ECtHR reconfirmed its case-law on the wearing of the Islamic 
headcarf in public places in two cases against Belgium. Once again, and similarly to the S.a.s. 
v. France case, the ECtHR concluded for the non-violation of the Convention. See European 
Court of Human Rights, Dakir v. Belgium No. 4619/12 and Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, 
No. 37798/13, both held on 11.07.2017. 
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Court that concluded for the non-violation of the principle of non-
discrimination with regard to the claims made by the applicants who 
complained to have been fired on account on their request to keep wearing 
the headscarf at work. 
 
6. Additional Reflections in the Light of a Recent Decision by the German 
Constitutional Court 
Recent cues to overcome the ECtHR’s deferential approach to the 
Contracting State come from a 2015 German Constitutional Court’s 
judgement that, overrulled its precedent of 2003 and allowing each Land to 
decide on weather to ban teachers to wear religious symbols in public 
shools, states that a general ban of wearing religious symbols in public 
schools is not compatible with freedom of religion and with the teachers’ 
freedom to profess their religion and belief (see, Articles 4, §§ 1 and 2, GG)80.  
The First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court decided on an 
application submitted by two teachers of a public shool of North Rein 
Westfalia who have been convicted by a labour Court for having refused to 
remove the veil during classes despite the prohibition prescribed by the Law.  
The judgement’s ratio decidendi moves from the statement that, to 
justify the ban «it is not sufficient that the expression of religious beliefs by 
outer appearance or conduct constitutes an abstract danger, it has to 
constitute a sufficiently specific danger of impairing the peace at school or 
the state’s duty of neutrality».  
The First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court goes on by underling 
that the Education Act, which is designed as a privilege of Christian-
occidental educational and cultural values or traditions, violates the 
prohibition of discrimination on religious ground. In fact, the Act presumes 
a conformity between the vaues of the german constitutional system, such 
as human dignity and equality, to those of the Christian occidental religion. 
Therefore, this part of the provision (Art. 3 sec. 3 sentence 1 and Art. 33 sec. 
3 GG) is void.  
Moreover, according to the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the ban has to be interpreted restrictively, in a way that is in 
 
80 For a comment, see Randazzo B., 2004, p. 148; Mangione G., 2003, p. 1908; Di Martino 
A., 2014. 
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conformity with the Constitution; in fact, the prohibition must not be 
referred to cases when teachers only wear the veil without putting 
students’s freedom and dignity at risk.  
More specifically, the Constitutional Court states that «the strict 
prohibition of the expression of religious beliefs by outer appearance or 
conduct, which is applicable in the whole Land and for which a mere abstract 
danger to the peace at school or to the neutrality of the state is deemed 
sufficient, cannot reasonably be imposed on the holders of fundamental 
rights in cases such as these»81. The competence of the Land is therefore 
persistent and applicable to cases where wearing an Islamic headscarf does 
constitute a sufficiently specific danger. 
Finally, the Constitutional Court alllows some discretion as to the 
application of the ban on a concrete case-to-case evaluation.  
This approach then reflects the nature of contemporary public schools 
that, in the Constitutional Court’s view, are “interdenominational” and 
mirror the religious-pluralist society «[w]earing clothes with a religious 
connotation does not per se constitute an interference with the pupils’ 
negative freedom of faith and freedom to profess a belief». With this 
respect, the Court points out that «the positive freedom of faith as exercised 
by educational staff [...] is relativised and compensated by the conduct of 
other members of staff with adherence to different faiths or ideologies»82.  
This is a very important and also eminent way of reasoning considering 
that it comes from one of the most influential constitutional Court in Europe.  
At the same time, the judgement reflects an approach that stands at the 
antipodes of the ECtHR’s arguments to justify the french ban of the integral 
islamic veil in public places83. 
Lastly, the Court applied the principle of secularism in its positive 
connotation, endorsing a concrete case-to-case evaluation of all those 
situations where a religious symbol, in itself harmless and to protect equally, 
could threaten the fundamental rights of a Secular State. 
 
 
81 Germany, First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
82 Germany, First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
83 The reference here is, again, to the European Court of Human Rights’s judgement on 
the S.a.s. v. France case. 
MARIA ELISA D’AMICO 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 3 (2017), n. 10, pag. 1-38.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 26 
7. Women’s Rights and the Challenge of Fundamentalism 
The majority of cases showing an endorsment of culturally or religiuos 
practices directly involves women’s rights84.  
On the controversial relationship between individual rights protection 
and religious fundamentalisms focused a scientific debate with a specific 
concentration on womens’ rights and gender related issues. It is in fact well-
known that fundamentalisms or religious integralisms conflicts with the 
principle of equality between men and women as a consequence of its 
patriarchal view of society. 
It was then with Susan Moller Okin’s Is multiculturalism bad for women?85 
that that debate finally opened up.  
The author challenges multicultural policies by questioning «what should 
be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions clash with the 
norm of gender equality that is at least formally endorsed by liberal states 
[...]?».  
The discussion on multiculturalism, meaning on those policies seeking to 
accomodate different cultures, covers the linked–phenomenon of religious 
integralism; this connection is important to reason on some legal categories 
that I believe inadequate.  
According to Susan Moller Okin, we need to be skeptical about the legal 
recognition of “groups rights”, since groups often endorse culture and 
religions that are oppressive and discriminatory towards women.  
Therefore, Okin criticizes those scholars, like Kimlycka86, who suggested 
that it would be useful to distinguish among groups, depending on their 
practices and policies towards women and dissenting individuals within the 
group, in order to grant protection only to those of them who intend to 
safeguard the principle of equality between men and women.  
The debate recalls the United States’ case-Law on cultural defense, 
 
84 For an overview on the contemporary debate and for a collection of the most relevant 
case-law on women’s rights, see Deller Ross S., 2009; Askin K. D., Koenig D. M. (eds.), 1998; 
on the relationship between fundamentalism, multiculturalism and the protection of the 
rights of women, see Stratton Hawley J. (ed.), 1994; Mookherjee M., 2009; Auga U., von 
Braun C., Burns C., Husmann J. (eds.), 2013. For a in-depth analysis on the feminist political 
thought on gender issues, see Young I.M., 1990. 
85 Okin S. M., 1999. See also S. Benhabib, 2002. 
86 For further reading on the Author’s thesis, see Kymlicka W., 1995. 
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stressing all those cases that show an infingement of women’s rights in the 
name of culture or religion.  
The author therefore invites «[t]hose who make liberal arguments for the 
rights of groups, then, must take special care to look at inequalities within 
those groups» 87  noting that «it is especially important to consider 
inequalities between the sexes, since they are likely to be less public, and 
thus less easily discernible»88.  
Moreover, according to Okin, «policies designed to respond to the need 
and claims of cultural minority groups must take seriously the urgency of 
adequately representing less powerful members of such group because the 
attention to the rights of minority cultural groups, if it is consistent with the 
fundamentals of liberalism, must ultimately be aimed at furthering the well-
being of the members of these groups, there can be no justification for 
assuming that the groups’ self-proclaimed leaders – invariably composed 
mainly of their older and their male members – and, more specifically, young 
women [...] represent the interests of all of the groups’ members [...]»89.  
A last aspect of the debate, then, involves the limits to freedom of religion 
in a liberal State; in the analysis on the relationship between freedom of 
religion, as a fundamental principle, and the principle of equality between 
men and women, the dilemma, as to weather freedom of religion deserves 
more or less care or attention than gender discrimination, is fully examined 
by laying bare abstract solutions, even at the case-Law level, that do not take 
into account the effective freedom of choice existing within the group as 
well as the level of oppression of women’s rights.  
Finally, the debate, that highlites one of the central issue of 
contemporary pluralistic democracies, ends by hoping for a multiculturalism 
that gives to gender and to other form of discriminations within the group 
what they deserve: a multiculturalism that treats individuals as morally 
equal.  
 
8. Democracy, Secularism and Tolerance: What We Can not Relinquish? 
With respect to these controversial set of problems, we can note that the 
 
87 Okin S. M., 1999, p. 23. 
88 Ibidem, p. 23. 
89 Ibidem,,p. 24. 
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jurisprudence is still very limited and that it has progressively developed 
restricted categories and reasonings, even thought at the same time it has 
shown a tendency to approch those very same issues more profitable. 
It is clear, though, that in Italy the principle of secularism was first 
interpreted in accordance with its positive connotation, due to the peculiar 
reliationship between the State and the Catholic Church and its values, 
which, for the most part, correspond to our Constitution’s supreme 
principles. At the same time, it is also undeniable that, in this case, the 
sacrifice of a negative form of secularism does not mean a sacrifice of the 
universal equality and of those non-negotiable rights.  
Therefore, if we look at the italian reality, we become very aware of the 
fact that not only the Courts, but even politics and the whole society are 
used to applying controversial categories without developing a model 
suitable for religions that differ from Catholicism.  
We can easily think of controversial measures, such as that regarding the 
regulation on place of worship established by Lombardia Region, that 
discriminates against other religions and that shows a persistent and 
unsolved tension that directly affects freedom of religion throughout the 
provisions of urban norms90. 
By the way, categories or concepts like multiculturalism and positive 
secularism are not appropriate since there are problems of integration and 
of cohabitation that are not resolvable by simply grating a formal equality 
that it is not substantial as well. 
Furthermore, if we think of Italy’s identity as a secular State, we can not 
forget Article 19’s original sin: the principle of secularism was not explicitely 
enshrined in the italian Constitution because it was believed unnecessary. It 
is also well-know that the Labriola’s emendament 91 , which stated the 
freedom of all the opinions and organizations aimed at declaring their non-
 
90 Law No. 12 of 2005, Legge per il governo del territorio, così come modificata con legge 
n. 2 del 2015, Modifiche alla legge regionale 11 marzo 2005, n. 12 (Legge per il governo del 
territorio) - Principi per la pianificazione delle attrezzature per servizi religiosi, that has been 
referred to the italian Constitutional Court as to the conformity of the law with Articles 3, 
8, 19, 117, §§ 1 and 2, lett. c), h), l), 118, § 3, and 119 of the Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court, with judgement no. 63 of 2016, nevertheless rejected the question of constitutional 
legitimacy. 
91 See, Labriola, Italian Constituent Assembly, 12.04.1947. 
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involvement in religious believes or their compliance with the principle of 
secularism, was set aside because considered implicit in the constitutional 
provision. From this perspective, freedom to believe also implies freedom to 
not believe, as our formers used to say.  
We cannot even ignore the last decade of Italy’s political debate, made 
of choices on fundamental rights that were inspired by a true 
fundamentalism, a juxtaposition of values that imposes downwards 
solutions disrespectful of individual autonomy.  
One example is Law No. 40 of 2004 on medically-assisted procreation, an 
ideological Law92, that imposes, in her previous formulation, the value of the 
embryo against all the other interests at stake and that has been challenged 
three times by the Constitutional Court93; we can then go on by thinking of 
the conscience objection within the Law on voluntary termination of 
pregnancy (Law No. 194 of 1978): again, an ideological application of the 
Law endangers women’s right to decide over their pregrancy94; finally, we 
can recall the so-called “Englaro case” and Beppino Englaro’s fight to see her 
daughter’s last will fully granted95.  
 
92 For a comment on Law No. 40 of 2004 from its coming into force, see D’Amico M., 
2008a, and D’Amico M., 2013; D’Amico M., Costantini M.P., Mengarelli M., 2014. See, also, 
Dolcini E., 2009, which stated that Law No. 40 of 2004 is a bad Law that represents a tool 
for fighting medically-assisted procreation tecniques.  
93 See, Constitutional Court, No. 151 of 2009, in “Giur. cost.”, 2009, p. 1656 and ss. (on 
the non compliance with italian Constitution of the limit of the number of embroys to be 
implanted with homologous tecniques); judgement No. 162 of 2014, in “Giur. cost.”, 2014, 
p. 2563 and ss. (on the illegitimacy of the prohibition of heterologous medically-assisted 
procreation tecniques); judgement No. 96 of 2015 (on the constitutional legitimacy of 
preimplantation diagnosis). For a comment, see D’Amico M., Pellizzone I. (eds.), 2010; 
D’Amico M., Costantini M. P. (eds.), 2014. 
94 See the judgement on the complaint against Italy, No. 87/2012, IPPF EN v. Italy. For a 
critique, see D’Amico M., Guiglia G. (Eds.), (2014), European Social Charter and the 
challenges of the XXI century, ESI, Naples.  
95 The case was definitely decided by a judgement delivered by the Court of Cassation 
(No. 21748 of 2007), that recognized the fundamental right of the patient to ask for the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration at the end of life under the concurrence of 
two circumstances: the patient’s will to withdrawl artificial nutrition and hydratation even 
as expressed prior to the loose of consciousness; the persistency of the vegetative state. 
For a comment on the judgement, see Romboli R., 2009, p. 91; D’Avack L., 2008, p. 759; 
Casonato C., 2008, p. 545. 
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In front of this panorama, it is clear that intolerance and a non-religious, 
but ideological, fundamentalism is spreading all over the place, putting at 
risk that so-called “metodo laico” (a method that it is based on the italian 
principle of secularism) that requires a balance among the interests at stake 
and that, although not surprisingly, affects extensively women’s rights and 
their bodies. 
To sum up, Courts and legislators must be fully aware of the need to 
preserve a set of universal fundamental rights as well as of the tricks hidden 
behind a recognition of cultures, that commit serious violations of that same 
set of rights96. The cultural defense is a tool that needs a real awareness of 
its dynamics, which would allow or facilitate a case-by-case evaluation, as 
suggested in its acute judgement by the german Constitutional Court.  
Hence, respect for other cultures turns into respect for others’ 
orthodoxies, damaging differences, individual liberties and discordance 
within the “other” community. And the libertarian and tolerant relativism 
becomes an ally of others’ intolerant orthodoxies.  
 
  
 
96 On the risks of cultural relativism, see Levi Della Torre S., 2012, p. 108. According to 
the author, freedom of religion and freedom of conscious are not religious principles, but, 
rather, are linked to the principle of secularism, that originate as a justaxposition against 
the official doctrine, mainly Catholicism. 
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